Recently new vulnerabilities like Zombie POODLE, GOLDENDOODLE, 0-Length OpenSSL and Sleeping POODLE were published for websites that use CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) block cipher modes. These vulnerabilities are applicable only if the server uses TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.0 with CBC cipher modes.
Update May 30, 2019: The grade change described below is now live on https://www.ssllabs.com/
Update March 12, 2019: SSL Labs Renegotiation Test is re-enabled on the development instance, and will be live on the production instance this week.
Update February 20, 2019: To give more time to fix, we will re-enable the SSL Labs Renegotiation Test on March 11, 2019 (two additional weeks).
The Apache Security Team fixed a bug which triggers whenever a client attempts renegotiation with Apache HTTP Server 2.4.37 and OpenSSL 1.1.1. This bug causes the Apache httpd service to consume 100% CPU. Details of the bug can be found at: https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=63052
Local testing by Qualys confirms that the SSL Labs renegotiation test triggers this bug for the above-mentioned server configuration, and can be used to cause the Apache httpd service on a target system to consume 100% CPU.
To allow Apache users time to apply the fix, SSL Labs has disabled the Renegotiation Test for one month, and we will re-enable it on February 25, 2019. While the test is disabled, users will not see the following in SSL Labs reports:
We would like to thank the Apache Security Team for working with us on this issue.
Update 1/16/2020: The grade change is now live on the development server at dev.ssllabs.com. Servers that support TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 are capped to B grade on the development server. Deployment to production SSL Labs servers is planned for the very end of January.
Update 10/11/19: The TLS 1.0/1.1 warning changes are now live on www.ssllabs.com. The grade change for supporting TLS 1.0/1.1 is changed from March 2020 to January 2020 as shown below in the “SSL Labs Grade Change” section below and as reflected in the summary messages in SSL Labs results.
Update 11/30/18: Now live on ssllabs.com: In Configuration->Protocols section “TLS 1.1” text color will be changed to Orange by end of November 2018.
TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 protocols will be removed from browsers at the beginning of 2020. As there are no fixes or patches that can adequately fix SSL or deprecated TLS, it is critically important that organizations upgrade to a secure alternative as soon as possible.
Various Browser clients have provided approximate deadlines for disabling TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 protocol:
Update March 1, 2018: The completion of these changes is documented under Version 1.31.0 in the SSL Labs Changelog.
We are giving advance notification for following grading criteria changes applying from March 1, 2018: Not using forward secrecy, not using AEAD suites, and vulnerability to ROBOT. Update: This release also includes a grading change for some Symantec certificates.
Over time, however, a different solution emerged and Symantec agreed to handle operations of their PKI to some other CA, selecting DigiCert for the role. In return, Google agreed to a deprecation plan that will still be difficult for Symantec, but allows them to resume issuance normally afterwards. Mozilla carried out their own investigation and decided to match Google’s actions and dates. In the final twist, Symantec decided to sell their certificate business to DigiCert.
This is the third post in my series on HPKP. In my first post I declared HPKP dead, and in my second post I explored the possibility of fixing it by introducing pin revocation. Today I will consider an entirely different approach to make HPKP much safer, by changing how it’s activated.
Last year, almost exactly to the day, I declared HPKP effectively dead. I believed then—and I still do—that HPKP is too complex and too dangerous to be worth the effort. The biggest problem lies in the fact that there is no sufficient margin of safety; pinning failures are always catastrophic. That’s always bothered me and I wondered if it was possible to somehow fix HPKP without starting from scratch. That’s what this blog post is about.
If you haven’t already read my last year’s blog post, I suggest that you do so now as it will make the discussion easier to follow. I’ll wait for you patiently until you come back.
Today I am exploring the possibility of fixing HPKP with an introduction of pin revocation, which would be used in case of emergency. Please note that, even though I’ll be trying to save HPKP from a technical perspective, I am not necessarily declaring that HPKP is worth saving. The landscape of PKI had changed and today we have Certificate Transparency (CT), which addresses one set of problems that HPKP was supposed to solve, and also Certification Authority Authorization (CAA), which addresses another set of problems. One could argue that, between CT and CAA, there is perhaps not enough left for HPKP to do, given its complexities. I’ll leave that discussion for some other time. For now, let’s attempt the challenge of making HPKP more palatable. Continue reading …
We’re excited to share with you the first preview of our next-generation grading. This is something that’s long overdue but, due to lack of available time, we managed to keep up patching the first-generation grading to keep up with the times. Now, finally, we’re taking the next necessary steps to modernise how we grade servers based on our assessments.
In the second half of 2016, a series of events unfolded that culminated with something many didn’t think was possible (or at least thought very unlikely): a public CA was distrusted. The CA in question was WoSign, a Chinese CA who made some waves by offering free certificates back in the day, before Let’s Encrypt came onto the scene. To make the case even more remarkable, another CA—StartCom—was distrusted at the same time. These were CAs with substantial installed user bases, largely because both had offered free certificates.
Certification Authority Authorization (CAA), specified in RFC 6844 in 2013, is a proposal to improve the strength of the PKI ecosystem with a new control to restrict which CAs can issue certificates for a particular domain name. Although CAA had been in the proposed-standard state for more than 4 years, there was little obvious happening until very recently, with only a hundred or two hundred sites adopting it. But that’s going to change, because the CA/Browser Forum recently voted to mandate CAA support as part of its certificate issuance standard Baseline Requirements. The changes will become effective in September 2017.